Who wants to revise privatization and why? Evidence from 28 post-communist countries by Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina et al.
Centre for
Economic
and Financial
Research
at
New Economic 
School
Who Wants to
Revise Privatization
and Why?
Evidence from 
28 Post-Communist
Countries
Irina Denisova
Markus Eller
Timothy Frye
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
Working Paper No 105
CEFIR / NES Working Paper series
November 2007
 
 
1
 
  Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why?  
Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries 
 
 
Irina Denisova, Markus Eller, Timothy Frye, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya* 
 
This draft: November 21, 2007 
 
 
Abstract: 
A 2006 survey of 28,000 individuals in 28 post-communist countries reveals overwhelming 
public support for the revision of privatization in the region. A majority of respondents, however, 
favors a revision of privatization that ultimately leaves firms in private hands. We identify which 
factors influence individuals’ support for revising privatization and explore whether respondents’ 
views are driven by a preference for state property or a concern for the fairness of privatization. 
We find that human capital poorly suited for a market economy with private ownership and a 
lack of privately owned assets increase support for revising privatization with the primary reason 
being a preference for state over private property. Economic hardships during transition and 
work in the state sector also increase support for revising privatization, but mainly due to the 
perceived unfairness of privatization. The effects of human capital and asset ownership on 
support for revising privatization are independent of a countries’ institutional environment. In 
contrast, good governance institutions amplify the impact of positive and negative transition 
experiences on attitudes toward revising privatization. In countries with low inequality, 
individuals with positive and negative transition experiences hold significantly different views 
about the superiority of private property, but this difference is much smaller in countries with 
high inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Spurred by a strong consensus among economists and international financial institutions, 
the privatization of state enterprises has been a central element of economic reform over the last 
25 years. Governments from Mexico to Indonesia to Georgia have shed considerable portions of 
their state sector, and by most, but, not all accounts, the beneficial effects of privatization have 
outweighed the costs (e.g., Guriev and Megginson 2007, Megginson and Netter 2001, 
Megginson 2005, McKenzie and Mookherjee 2003). Yet, for all its benefits, privatization is 
widely reviled by the public. Survey results from 17 Latin American countries in 2003 found that 
almost two-thirds of respondents thought that privatization was “not beneficial” and forty percent 
disagreed with the statement “the state should leave productive activities to the private sector” 
(Lora and Panizza 2003). A representative survey of Russia’s population in 2006 found that fifty 
two percent of respondents agree with the statement “the majority of private assets in the country 
should be nationalized” (CEFIR 2007). A representative survey of citizens in 28 post-communist 
countries in 2006 found that over 80 percent of respondents would like to revise current 
privatization in some way (EBRD 2007 a, b). Given the lack of public support for privatization, 
it is hardly surprising that recent years have seen significant reversals of privatization in Bolivia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.1   
 The survey results for the post-communist world are somewhat surprising. Most countries 
in the region conducted considerable privatization in the early to mid 1990s and, after a steep 
initial decline, experienced strong economic growth from the end of the 1990s onwards.2 In the 
last ten years, the average annual real GDP growth in the 28 post-communist countries was 5.5 
percent; moreover, it has been accelerating: in the last five years, countries of the region grew at 
6.8 percent on average. Since the private sector has been the major driver of this economic 
recovery, one would expect a lower demand for re-nationalization in countries with higher 
growth rates. But, in fact, this is not the case (see Figure 1). So, why is privatization so 
                                                 
1 Contrary to a widespread view that re-nationalizations in the Former Soviet Union are confined to the energy and 
media sectors, a lot of privatization reversals occurred in manufacturing and financial sectors. For example, in 
Russia, OMZ (“United Machine Plants”), Siloviye Mashini ("Power machines"), AvtoVAZ (the largest automotive 
plant) and such banks as PromStroyBank and Guta Bank are among the biggest re-nationalized assets; the largest re-
privatization in Ukraine was the giant steelmaker Kryvorozhstal. 
2 Cross-national empirical studies from the region find that privatization is generally positively associated with or 
unrelated to economic growth (Zinnes et al. 2001; Estrin et al. 2007; Bennett et al. 2007). Firm-level analyses also 
generally find that privatization has either positive or no effect on performance (cf., Frydman et al. 1999; Djankov 
and Murrell 2002; Brown et al. 2006; Brown et al. 2007); yet these studies understate the effect of privatization on 
economic growth as they fail to take into account the positive externalities from privatization on de-novo private 
sector development.  
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unpopular? Is it because people prefer state to private ownership? If so, do they believe in the 
superiority of state ownership for ideological reasons or because they expect personal economic 
gains from re-nationalization? Alternatively, do they favor revising privatization to achieve a 
more equitable redistribution of property based on the notion that current owners obtained 
privatized assets unfairly? We address these questions in the paper. 
Generally, the extent of public support for revising privatization is a critical issue for 
efficiency. The mere threat of revising the privatization bargain weakens the incentives of private 
owners. In order to make formerly state-owned assets more productive, the new owners often 
must make irreversible investments ex ante. If the public favors revising privatization, owners of 
privatized property anticipate the possibility of being expropriated by populist politicians ex post 
and refrain from making productive investments. This, in turn, further increases the support for 
expropriation. Moreover, in the more corrupt countries of the region (such as Russia and 
Ukraine), political elites use public sentiment in favor of privatization revision to redistribute 
assets to themselves or their supporters. As these property redistributions do not increase the 
legitimacy of new owners, the specter of “permanent re-distribution” from one owner to another 
dramatically weakens private property rights (e.g., Hellman 2002 or Sonin 2003). 
The reasons behind the support for revision of privatization also have important policy 
implications. If support for revising privatization is due to relative losses from returns to human 
capital, then retraining programs that improve skills can be effective. Whereas, if support for 
revising privatization is driven by concerns for fairness, then inefficient redistribution may be 
unavoidable (Alesina and Rodrik 1994).   
 We analyze the results of the “Life in Transition” survey of 28,000 individuals from 28 
transition countries conducted by the World Bank and EBRD (EBRD 2007 a, b). The survey 
asked respondents whether they would like to revise privatization results; and if so, whether they 
prefer privatized assets be re-nationalized and left in state hands, re-nationalized and then re-
privatized to new owners using a more transparent procedure, or be left with the current owners 
provided they pay additional compensation for their privatized assets. Respondents express 
strong support for revising privatization in all post-communist countries: more than one half of 
the population in each of the 28 countries supports some form of revision of privatization. Less 
than one-third of respondents, however, favored a re-nationalization that leaves firms in state 
hands. Thus, support for revising privatization should not be equated with support for re-
nationalization. 
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 We develop a simple framework for analyzing responses to this question in light of two 
possible reasons for supporting the revision of privatization: a concern for the fairness of 
privatization or a preference for state over private property. We examine how the respondents’ 
endowments of human capital, assets, ideology, employment history and experience during 
transition affect support for revising privatization. We also examine why individuals hold these 
views.3 
 Controlling for country-level variation with fixed effects, we examine how individual 
characteristics shape attitudes towards privatization within countries. We find that respondents 
with less human capital and human capital specific to an economy dominated by state ownership 
favor revising privatization.  More specifically, older respondents, those in less skilled jobs, in 
poorer health, and with only vocational educations are significantly more likely to support 
revising privatization. Respondents hold this view primarily due to expectations of greater 
relative returns to their specific human capital in an economy with extensive state ownership 
because re-nationalization is expected to reverse wage decompression partly associated with 
privatization (Milanovic 1999).  Asset ownership is also related to attitudes towards revising 
privatization. Respondents who own a house or apartment are far less likely to favor revising 
privatization.  Again, this view is rooted in calculations of personal gains (or expectations of 
losses). In addition, individuals use their personal experience during the transition to evaluate 
privatization. Most clearly, significant and sustained economic hardships during transition (e.g., 
food cuts, forced asset sales, and wage cuts) are associated with greater support for revising 
privatization. Respondents who hold this position are generally motivated by a belief in the 
unfairness of privatization outcomes. Similarly, career trajectories during transition affect 
evaluations of privatization: the more years that a respondent worked in the state sector during 
transition, the more likely she favors revising privatization due to concerns over fairness, 
presumably because she believes that she missed out on gains from the initial round of 
                                                 
3 Scholars have studied extensively the consequences of privatization, but have paid far less attention to support for 
revising privatization. Our study is the first one to examine the motivations that underpin support for revising 
privatization. Studies from the post-communist world have examined attitudes towards market economies or the 
private sector more generally, but only few focus directly on the privatization of state-owned enterprises (cf., Duch 
1993; 1995). Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) present a formal model that incorporates the legitimacy of privatization as a 
parameter, but offer only illustrative evidence from the post-communist region. Frye (2006; 2007) uses an 
experiment embedded in surveys of business elites and the mass public in Russia to determine how the severity of 
violations of the law on privatization, investments by rightholders, and the provision of public goods by rightholders 
influence support for revising privatization, but his findings are limited to a single country and focus on only a few 
variables of interest. Most closely related to our paper are cross-national studies from Latin America that probe the 
determinants of support for privatization; these studies, however, do not examine the reasons behind popular support 
for re-nationalization (Boix 2005, Graham and Sukhtankar 2004, Lora and Panizza 2003, Panizza and Yanez 2006). 
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privatization.  Other aspects of career trajectories during the transition, such as moving from 
wage work to self-employment, or working for longer periods in the private sector, strengthen 
the preference for private over state property, but do not affect attitudes towards revising 
privatization.  
  In the second part of our analysis, we examine how a country’s governance institutions, 
privatization policies, and income inequality influence the differences in individual attitudes 
towards the revision of privatization. Most interesting, country-level factors do not change the 
way in which human capital and asset ownership influence attitudes toward revising 
privatization.   In contrast, institutions do affect the link between transition-related experiences 
and support for the revision of privatization. In particular, in countries with better governance, 
stronger democracy, and more extensive private ownership respondents moving from work for 
wages to self-employment are significantly more likely to oppose revising privatization than 
their counterparts in countries with weaker institutions. Good governance and extensive private 
ownership also magnify differences in preferences over property type between those who 
experienced severe economic hardships during transition and the rest of the population. 
Inequality does not directly affect the link between individual transition histories and attitudes 
towards revising privatization, but it does decrease the differences in the belief of the superiority 
of state over private property between those with relatively successful and unsuccessful 
transition histories. Finally, the method of privatization does not significantly affect individual 
attitudes towards the revision of privatization, but the extent of privatization in the respective 
country does: opposition to the revision of privatization by the newly-created class of self-
employed is larger in countries with more extensive privatization.  
 We proceed by presenting data on support for revising privatization in Section 2. We then 
present our hypotheses and empirical methodology in Section 3 and discuss our results in 
Sections 4 and 5.  Section 6 describes robustness checks. Conclusions are presented in Section 7.  
 
2. Public Support for Revising Privatization: Data Summary 
 To study public support for revising privatization, we rely on the “Life in Transition 
Survey” (LiTS). Face-to-face interviews were conducted for a representative sample of 1,000 
individuals in each of 28 post-communist countries in Europe and Central Asia .4   
                                                 
4 For technical details of the survey, see the Appendix and EBRD 2007a. The exact list of countries is as follows: 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR 
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We focus on responses to the following question from LiTS: 
“In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized companies? They should be… 
 (1) Renationalized and kept in state hands; 
 (2) Renationalized and then re-privatized again using a more transparent process; 
 (3) Left in the hands of current owners provided they pay privatized assets’ worth; 
(4) Left in the hands of current owners with no change.” 
Table 1 here. 
 Table 1 summarizes responses to this question. In sum, twenty nine percent of 
respondents preferred re-nationalization and leaving property in state hands. Seventeen percent 
of respondents supported re-nationalization followed by privatization to new owners using a 
more transparent process. Thirty-five percent of respondents favored leaving property in the 
hands of the current owners provided they pay what the privatized assets are worth. And a little 
over nineteen percent of respondents favored the status quo of leaving privatized assets in the 
hands of current owners with no additional payments. The support for revising privatized 
property varies considerably across countries. Re-nationalization and keeping companies in state 
hands is strongly preferred in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (between 40% in Armenia 
and about 52% in Uzbekistan). The highest support for re-nationalization followed by re-
privatization using a more transparent process is observed in the South Caucasus and in Croatia. 
In contrast, respondents in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Montenegro, 
Romania, and Serbia have a strong preference for leaving property with current owners, provided 
that they pay what the privatized assets are worth (between 48% in Bulgaria and 53% in 
Romania). The least support for revising privatization is found in Belarus, Estonia, and 
Mongolia; where 47, 44, and 37% of respondents, respectively, support leaving most privatized 
companies in the hands of current owners without any change. 
 The four alternative answers to this question shed light on why respondents support or 
oppose privatization.  We can distinguish between two possible arguments for the revision of 
privatization: a preference for state over private property and a concern about the fairness of 
privatization. In particular, one could support revising privatization because the policy was 
implemented unfairly even though one prefers private to state property; then, one would opt for a 
revision of privatization that leaves property in private hands, i.e., choose alternatives (2) or (3). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.   
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One could also favor the revision of privatization purely due to a preference for state property, 
and, therefore, choose alternative (1). Moreover, a preference for state property could arise for 
ideological reasons as one could believe that state property is superior to private property in 
general or because one could personally benefit from moving property to state hands. The 
question on revision of privatization does not allow us to differentiate between the two 
underlying reasons for a preference for state property. We distinguish between them in 
regression analysis by controlling for respondents’ ideological views toward state property.5  
Table 2 summarizes our interpretation of the four alternative answers. We consider 
individuals who want any type of change in privatization (those choosing alternative (1), (2), and 
(3) over (4)) as favoring the revision of privatization, while individuals who favor leaving 
property in private hands with no change (alternative (4) over (1), (2), and (3)) as opposing the 
revision of privatization. Further, we consider individuals who favor leaving privatized assets in 
the hands of the current owners provided that they pay what the assets are worth (alternative (3)) 
and individuals who chose re-nationalization followed by re-privatization to new owners 
(alternative (2)) as favoring private property, but being concerned about the fairness of 
privatization. Finally, we treat individuals who support re-nationalization and leaving property in 
the hands of the state (alternative (1) over (2), (3), and (4)) as preferring state property to private 
property. It is difficult to know what individuals, who support re-nationalization and leaving 
property in state hands, think about the fairness of privatization. It could be that they have 
concerns about the fairness of privatization and do not think that re-privatization could help, and 
therefore, favor nationalization. However, it is also plausible that they view the process of 
privatization as fair, but favor leaving assets in state hands for ideological reasons or because 
they expect private gains from doing so. We assume that both reasons are equally likely when 
alternative (1) is chosen.    
Table 2 here. 
The construction of this LiTS question permits us to go beyond previous studies which 
have tended only to focus on support for and opposition to privatization. By examining a broader 
range of possible responses, we gain greater insight into the sources of the revision of 
privatization.  
                                                 
5 It is important to note that different motivations for revising privatization are not mutually exclusive: one could 
favor revising privatization based on fairness concerns and also due to a preference for state property. The survey, 
however, allowed only one answer to the question on revision of privatization. Therefore, we cannot observe 
multiple motivations for each individual. We can observe multiple motivations for a group of individuals, however, 
as we observe the shares of people from a particular group choosing alternatives (1), (2), and (3).  
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3. Methodology  
 
3.1. Hypothesis Testing 
 We seek to identify the determinants of attitudes towards privatization by running 
multinomial cross-section regressions of the type: 
,    (1) 
where i indexes the 28,000 individuals. Yi is a four-category response to the revision of 
privatization question. The outcomes, denoted by k, are the alternative answers: (1) re-
nationalize and keep in state hands; (2) re-nationalize and then re-privatize; (3) leave in the 
hands of current owners and pay what the assets are worth; (4) leave in the hands of current 
owners without any change. Yi is treated as a multinomial variable. Xi denotes a vector of 
explanatory variables discussed below, and εik is an error term.. We estimate equation (1) using 
the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to take individual-specific heteroskedasticity 
into account. In addition, we cluster error terms by primary sampling units (PSUs) – fifty in each 
country – to adjust the standard errors for intra-PSU correlations.6  
 Denote Bk to be the estimated marginal effect of the influence of variable Xi on the 
probability of choosing  outcome k from the multinomial dependent variable Yi,  k=1,2,3,4: 
. 
Based on the results of the estimation, we compute marginal effects on probabilities (Bk) and 
conduct the following three types of hypothesis tests for each of the explanatory variables of the 
vector Xi.    
Test 1: Preference towards the Revision of Privatization.  
We say that a particular characteristic Xi increases the preference towards revising privatization 
if we observe the following relationship between the estimated marginal effects:                                      
B1 + B2 + B3 > B4 .           (2) 
Conversely, if B1 + B2 + B3 < B4, then the variable Xi is said to decrease support for revising 
privatization. 
                                                 
6 There are 50 PSUs for each of the 28 transition countries and 20 individuals are chosen randomly from each PSU. 
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Test 2: Preference for State Property.  
We say that a characteristic Xi is associated with stronger preference for state over private 
property if:   
B1 > B2 + B3 + B4.     (3) 
Conversely, if B1 < B2 + B3 + B4, then Xi strengthens the preference for private over state 
property. 
 
Test 3: The Unfairness of Privatization.  
We say that Xi is associated with the perception that privatization was unfair if:   
B2 + B 3 > B4.       (4) 
Conversely, if B2 + B3 < B4, then Xi strengthens the view that privatization was fair. 
Table 2 summarizes the three types of tests described in this section. For all the tests, we 
apply standard  tests for the equality of coefficients. 
 
3.2. Explanatory Variables  
 To begin, we assess the impact of individual characteristics on attitudes toward revising 
privatization taking the institutional environment and all other country characteristics as given by 
including country-level fixed effects. Conceptually, we distinguish between the following groups 
of explanatory variables (i) human capital, such as skills, education, age, and health; (ii) wealth 
endowments, such as ownership of property and wealth; (iii) transition experiences, including 
labor market history and the extent of economic hardships during transition; (iv) ideological 
factors, such as support for market economies, state ownership, and democracy; and (v) 
subjective perceptions about government and its role, such as trust in public institutions, 
corruption, and importance of law and order.  In the next section, we discuss the theoretical 
predictions about the effect of these groups of variables and present the results.  
 In all specifications, we control for the respondent’s gender, location of residence (rural 
vs. urban vs. metropolitan area), religion, whether the respondent belongs to an ethnic minority, 
and current labor market status (employed vs. unemployed). As mentioned above, we also 
control for the country of residence with country dummies.    
To sum up, we use the following vector of covariates Xi from equation (1) in our baseline 
specification:  
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Xi = [HCi, Wi, Ti,  Ii,  Si,  FCi,  Ci].   (5) 
HCi denotes a set of human capital individual-level variables, Wi denotes the assets 
endowments, Ti represents transition experiences, Ii stands for ideological factors, Si denotes the 
set of subjective perception variables, FCi stands for country-specific dummies, and Ci represents 
other individual controls. All variables are described and summarized in Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix.7  As a refinement of the baseline estimation, we also include interactions of selected 
individual-level characteristics with the vector of covariates.  
In a final step, we examine how country-level characteristics (such as governance 
institutions, democracy, inequality, or method and extent of privatization) affect individual 
attitudes towards support for revising privatization. To measure the quality of governance 
institutions, we use the corruption perception index from Transparency International; the 
democracy index from POLITY IV; and the World Bank indices of voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, control over corruption, and regulatory 
quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006). To examine whether the degree of country-
specific income inequality has an impact on the revision of privatization, we use the most recent 
Gini coefficients, as provided by the World Bank (2005) and additional sources. We use the 
following indicators of privatization at the country level: the extent of privatization by 2006, the 
number of years from the start of privatization, and whether privatization transferred property 
primarily to enterprise insiders or outsiders. Detailed definitions and summary statistics for the 
national-level variables are presented in Tables A1 and A3 in the Appendix.   
We analyze the impact of national-level variables by exploring the possibility that the 
effects of individual-level factors vary across countries. Thus, we include interaction terms 
between individual-level variables and national-level variables of interest into our vector of 
covariates Xi. Note that we continue to control for the institutional environment in each country 
with country-fixed effects. Thus, the augmented vector of covariates takes the following form:  
Xi’ = [Institutioni × Individuali, Xi], 
where Institutioni, is the country characteristic of interest, Individuali is the individual 
characteristic of interest and Xi is defined in equation (5).8  
                                                 
7 As we discuss in the robustness section, the exclusion of subjective perceptions measures from the set of covariates 
(due to their possible endogeneity) does not affect coefficients and significance of other variables. 
8 Note that we subtract the sample mean from the variables in the interaction term before taking the interaction in 
order to have the direct effect being estimated at the mean of all explanatory variables. 
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Tables 3 and 4 present the results of our empirical estimation.  Both tables have the same 
structure. Columns 2 to 5 report the estimated marginal effects for the four outcomes of the 
dependent variable, with z-statistics in brackets.  The next three columns report p-values of the 
tests described in Section 3.1. The last three columns present the implications of these tests. In 
particular, the ninth column reports the estimated effect of a particular characteristic in Xi on the 
preference for or against revising privatization. The next column reports the results of the tests of 
whether this component of Xi makes respondents more likely to favor revising privatization 
based on their preference for state versus private property. Similarly, the last column presents 
results of testing whether or not Xi affects respondents’ considerations of the fairness of 
privatization. If there are no statistically significant results, the cells are left blank in these three 
“conclusion” columns. 
 
4. Who Supports Revising Privatization? 
 In this section, we present our hypotheses and empirical results about the individual-level 
determinants of support for revising privatization. We organize our presentation by discussing 
predictions and results for each group of factors separately. 
 
4.1. Individual Endowments of Human Capital 
 Privatization may affect the career prospects of different groups of people differently. 
Individuals with higher skills and better opportunities to take advantage of transition are 
expected to express greater support for privatization and oppose its revision.  Groups with skills 
and networks specifically developed for an economy dominated by state-owned firms may have 
strong incentives to oppose privatization fearing diminished career opportunities.  For instance, 
older people are expected to have a vested interest against privatization since the private sector is 
known to provide relatively lower, if any, return to the experience obtained during the pre-reform 
period, while the state sector is known to provide positive returns to experience (e.g., Brainerd 
1998).9  In sum, older, less healthy, less educated, and less skilled individuals are expected to be 
especially strong supporters of revising privatization based primarily on how it shapes their 
economic prospects; and, therefore, their views are motivated by their relative gains from state 
                                                 
9 In labor market studies, age – being a proxy for experience – is often considered to be positively associated with 
human capital (e.g., Willis 1986).  As workers gain experience, they accumulate human capital. This relationship is 
less pronounced in the post-communist countries because the older workers were trained in skills that are far less 
applicable to current market conditions compared to their younger counterparts.   
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versus private property. There is no clear-cut predication about how human capital is related to 
the likelihood that a respondent evaluates privatization based on concerns for fairness.  One 
might expect respondents with higher education to have greater capacity to judge information 
related to the process of privatization. In that case, the effect of human capital on views about 
revision of privatization would depend on the actual privatization process in the country. 
 We measure human capital by the highest educational degree obtained by the respondent 
(ranking from no degree to post graduate degree), age, self-reported health status, and by the 
skill-type of the respondent’s occupation in 2006. LiTS provides data on occupation for those 
who worked for wages in any of the years following 1989. We distinguish between occupations 
requiring high skills and occupations requiring low or medium skills. 
 Panel A of Table 3 presents the results for an estimation of the baseline equation which 
focuses on individual-level variables and takes the institutional environment as given. We find 
that the human capital variables are generally good predictors of attitudes toward revising 
privatization. Age is positively associated with support for revising privatization. Older 
respondents express this preference due to their support for state property. A 10-year increase in 
the age of a respondent increases the probability of support for revising privatization by 0.7 
percentage points, and for re-nationalization as a means of revising privatization by 1.5 
percentage points. The result is consistent with the vested interest argument as older respondents 
have accumulated skills more relevant for the state sector than for the private sector. 
Interestingly, age is not related to a belief that privatization should be revised based on concerns 
for fairness.   
 Skills have a similar effect. Workers with low skills are more likely to favor revising 
privatization, and the reason respondents hold this view is their support for state property. 
Holding a low-skilled occupation increases the probability of supporting the revision of 
privatization by 2 percentage points, and of supporting a re-nationalization that leaves assets in 
state hands by 5 percentage points compared to the reference group.10 Again, the low skilled hold 
this belief because they support state property. Skills are unrelated to concerns for fairness of 
privatization. In addition, individuals in poor health are more likely to favor revising 
                                                 
10 The reference group here is those working for wages in high-skilled occupations, the self-employed and those not 
working. 
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privatization. They hold this view for both reasons: they favor state property and view 
privatization as unfair.11 
The relationship between education and attitudes toward revising privatization is 
somewhat more complex because the level of education in transition economies does not reflect 
the possession of skills specific to a market economy.  The most clear-cut pattern in the effects of 
education is that the educational level monotonically increases concerns over the fairness of 
privatization. Presumably, this is because more educated individuals are more aware of the actual 
process of privatization. As far as the preference for state vs. private property is concerned, 
respondents with higher education (i.e. university, college, or postgraduate degree) have a strong 
preference for private property compared to the rest of the population.12 For example, the 
probability that a respondent with a higher degree supports a re-nationalization that leaves assets 
in state hands is 2.9 percentage points lower than for a secondary school graduate. As a result of 
the interplay of the two motivations, respondents with a high school (i.e. secondary) degree are 
significantly more likely to oppose revising privatization than respondents with less than 
secondary education (due to unfairness considerations). In contrast, they are less likely to oppose 
revision of privatization than respondents with professional and vocational training (due to both 
reasons). And they are equally likely to support privatization revision as respondents with higher 
education (but for a different reason: high school graduates are less in favor of private property, 
but also consider privatization as more fair compared to college graduates).  
In sum, individuals with human capital suited for an economy with extensive state 
ownership (i.e., old and low-skilled individuals) are especially likely to favor revising 
privatization and are likely to hold this view due to a preference for state property rather than due 
to fairness considerations. Because we control for the respondent’s preferred extent of state 
ownership directly (as we discuss below in Section 4.4), the preference for state property is 
likely to be rooted in expectations of personal gains from reversing privatization.13 
                                                 
11 Privatization may influence the quality and costs of public services. As Boix (2005: 7) notes: “given high fixed 
costs in the investments they need to undertake, privatized companies first target high-income clients and tailor their 
services in way that discriminates against areas with a high concentration of low-income individuals.”  This may 
lead the individuals with poor health – as they have a particularly strong need to have an access to healthcare – to 
oppose privatization. 
12 There is no difference in preferences for state vs. private property among respondents with different educational 
levels below higher education. 
13 It is interesting to put these findings in comparative perspective.  Studies from Latin America have mixed results 
about the effect of human capital on attitudes towards privatization.  In the study of 17 Latin American countries, 
Panizza and Yanez (2006) find that those with a professional degree were strong supporters of privatization, but also 
report that respondents with a moderate level of education were significantly more likely to oppose privatization. 
Graham and Sukhtankar (2004) use a similar data set and find that education was associated with higher levels of 
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4.2. Assets and Wealth 
 Wealth and property ownership may also shape attitudes toward the revision of 
privatization.  Richer individuals with accumulated private assets are more likely to favor private 
property over state property because of fears that re-nationalization and expropriation may not 
stop at large private businesses, but may potentially affect their personal holdings.  Personal 
assets could also be related to the likelihood that respondents evaluate privatization on fairness 
grounds if respondents obtained their assets through privatization. We identify property owners 
as respondents living in a household in which any household member (including the respondent) 
is the majority owner of a house or an apartment.  We measure individual wealth using data from 
LiTS on the annual consumption expenditures for each household (for more details see Table 
A1). 
We find that ownership of a home or apartment is strongly associated with opposition to 
revising privatization and this view is driven solely by a preference for private property. The 
probability that an individual who owns a home or apartment opposes the revision of 
privatization is 2 percentage points higher than for an individual who does not own a home or 
apartment. Property ownership is also associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase in 
opposition to a re-nationalization that leaves assets in state hands.  Similarly, respondents 
reporting a movement up the income ladder relative to 1989 strongly oppose the revision of 
privatization and the main reason behind this view is a preference for private property.  In none 
of these cases do respondents evaluate privatization based on fairness considerations.    
 In contrast, wealth has a less straightforward relationship towards the revision of 
privatization.  Individuals from the upper part of the wealth distribution (compared to individuals 
from the lower part of the distribution) are more likely to view privatization as unfair and support 
redistribution through taxation (i.e., alternative (3)); but, at the same time, they oppose 
expropriation of current owners through re-nationalization where property is kept in state hands. 
As a result, the overall effect of wealth on revising privatization is ambiguous.14 
                                                                                                                                                             
support for privatization in 2001, but the relationship was reversed in 2002.  Boix (2005) uses data from Mexico in 
1998 and 2003 and Peru in 2003 and finds no relationship between education and support for privatization in either 
country. 
14 The fact that members of the upper income deciles express concern with the fairness of privatization may be less 
surprising than it appears at first glance. In LiTS these individuals are likely to belong to the middle class rather than 
to the upper class because of relatively high income inequality in transition countries and the inherent under-
representation of the upper class in individual and household surveys (Deaton 2005). Therefore, the effect of wealth 
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4.3. Individual Transition Experience  
 Identifying the consequences of privatization is difficult even for knowledgeable citizens.  
Privatization is often conducted as a part of a package of reforms, which may make it hard for 
individuals to identify its consequences. Furthermore, privatization is a technically complex 
policy whose effects may take years to appear. Given the difficulty of evaluating privatization, 
individuals may use their personal experience during transition as a metric for evaluating 
privatization.  Individuals who adjusted poorly to the new economic conditions, i.e., those who 
experienced sustained periods of wage cuts or food cuts, may attribute their hardships to 
privatization and are likely to favor revising it.  Similarly, respondents whose career trajectories 
were negatively affected by the transition – those who held many jobs, or failed to move from 
working in the state sector to entrepreneurship – are also likely to blame privatization for their 
woes and support revision. In sum, individuals experiencing significant economic losses or 
negative career trajectories during the transition may support revising privatization and may hold 
this view for two reasons. If they expected re-nationalization to put an end to their losses, they 
would have a preference for state ownership; and if they attributed their losses to inequities in the 
process of privatization, they would support revising privatization out of fairness concerns.  
 LiTS data enable us to reconstruct each individual job trajectory since 1989. We observe 
whether the respondent worked for wages (in the state or private sector, in a high- or low-skill 
occupation), was a self-employed or an entrepreneur, or was not employed in each year between 
1989 and 2006.15 To identify the impact of individual job trajectories for each respondent, we 
calculate the number of jobs held since 1989, the number of years working in the state sector, the 
number of years working in the private sector, and a large number of variables reflecting the 
direction of job changes, e.g., moves from state to private sector, from low-skill to high-skill 
occupation, or from work for wages to self-employment and entrepreneurship.  
Remarkably, with one notable exception – i.e., the number of years worked in the state 
sector – employment trajectories are not significantly related to support for revising 
privatization. They do, however, shape whether respondents evaluate privatization based on a 
preference for property type or concerns for fairness.  For example, the longer an individual 
worked for wages in either the state or private sector, the more likely she is to view privatization 
                                                                                                                                                             
on the perception of fairness of privatization may actually be U-shaped with the middle class being the most 
concerned with fairness. 
15 We cannot distinguish between self-employed and entrepreneurs, however. 
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as unfair. While work in the private sector is related to a belief in the unfairness of privatization, 
it does not diminish support for private property: the longer a respondent worked for wages in 
the private sector, the more likely she is to favor private property. As a result, the two 
motivations cancel each other out: private sector veterans do not express significant support for 
or against revising privatization. The probability of opposing state property increases by 3.3 
percentage points for each ten year increase in work experience in the private sector. The result 
is not symmetric for those working in the state sector: the length of work in the state sector is not 
associated with stronger preferences towards state property, but it is the only career trajectory 
variable that directly predicts support for revising privatization. A ten-year increase in state 
sector employment decreases the probability of recognizing the status quo privatization outcome 
by 2.3 percentage points. The main reason behind this stance is the perceived unfairness of 
privatization.    
Job turnover, the direction of career trajectory, and changes in the type of ownership of 
enterprises where the respondents worked for wages, do not have a significant effect on attitudes 
towards the revision of privatization, private vs. state property, or the fairness of privatization 
once we control for the level of skills and the years of experience in the state and private 
sectors.16  In contrast, the move from work for wages to self-employment has an important and 
robust effect: those who moved from work for wages to self-employment are strongly in favor of 
private property. The probability that they oppose re-nationalization is 6 percentage points higher 
compared to all other respondents.  There is no evidence that this group has a different attitude 
about the fairness of privatization than the rest of the population and their support for private 
property does not lead them to hold significantly different views on revising privatization 
compared to the rest of the population.  
In addition, we examine the impact of important economic hardships during transition, 
such as the number of years that the respondent experienced wage cuts, food cuts, or needed to 
sell household assets.  We find that individuals who experience extensive economic losses 
related to transition are significantly more likely to favor revising privatization. Individuals who 
experienced relatively small losses (such as wage cuts and asset sales) tend to hold this view due 
to concerns about the fairness of privatization. More extreme forms of deprivation (such as cuts 
in basic food consumption) undermine confidence in private ownership: respondents who 
                                                 
16 We omit variables that reflect moves between private and state sector employment and high- and low-skilled jobs 
from the list of regressors because they have no significant impact themselves and have no effect on coefficients of 
other explanatory variables. 
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endured long periods of cuts in basic food consumption prefer state ownership. An additional 
year of wage cuts or wage arrears decreases the probability of recognizing the status quo 
privatization outcome by 0.6 percentage points, and an additional year of having to sell 
household assets decreases this probability by 0.7 percentage points. An additional year of 
having to cut down on basic food consumption increases support for revising privatization by 0.2 
percentage points. 
 
4.4. Ideology and Perceptions of Government 
 The respondent’s perceptions of government institutions affect support for revising 
privatization. Perceptions of government quality, especially the perception of the current level of 
corruption, are strong predictors of support for revising privatization.  Respondents who view the 
government as more corrupt in 2006 than in 1989 and those who view law and order as very 
important support the revision of privatization on fairness grounds. Finally, ideological factors 
are also strongly associated with attitudes toward privatization. In particular, respondents who 
express a normative preference for autocracy over democracy, for central planning over the 
market, and for state ownership over private ownership of large assets are significantly more 
likely to support revising privatization than respondents who hold the opposite views. 
 
4.5. Individual-Level Interactions 
 Panel B of Table 3 presents two interesting interaction effects: (1) between wealth and 
education and (2) between age and skills. An increase in the respondent’s level of education 
leads to an increase in the effect of wealth on the likelihood of support for the status quo. This 
view is driven by a greater increase in the perception that privatization was fair among educated 
wealthy individuals compared to uneducated wealthy individuals. In addition, an increase in 
respondents’ skills reduces the effect of age on support for the revision of privatization: older 
respondents have a less negative view of the status quo privatization outcome than younger 
respondents when their skills are high. This result suggests that the opportunities gained by 
possessing higher skills offset the negative effect of age. More broadly, these results underscore 
the importance of human capital suitable for a market economy for the legitimacy of 
privatization.17  
                                                 
17 The controls for gender, household size, location, current labor market status and religion reveal that males are 
more likely to support private property, and rural households are more likely to be state property proponents as 
compared to metropolitan households. At the same time these factors are not significantly related to support for or 
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5. Do Institutions and Policies Shape Individual Attitudes towards Revising Privatization? 
 In this section, we test whether the effects of individual-level factors vary across 
institutional and economic environments. On the one hand, good governance institutions may 
increase the opportunities available to potential and actual economic winners relative to the rest 
of the population and thereby magnify the impact of positive transition experiences on attitudes 
towards revising privatization.  The same reasoning can be applied to the extent of privatization. 
This logic suggests that good institutions and broad-based privatization should amplify the 
effects of positive and negative transition experiences on attitudes toward revising privatization. 
If this view were correct, economic winners should be even stronger opponents (and losers – 
stronger proponents) of revising privatization.  On the other hand, if associated with an elaborate 
social safety net, good governance institutions may reduce differences in attitudes towards 
revising privatization between transition winners and losers, both by leveling the playing field 
and by promoting procedural fairness in the making of privatization policy.  In this case, good 
institutions should minimize differences between economic winners and losers from transition.
 The way in which privatization was conducted also may affect the link between 
individual work trajectories and attitudes towards privatization. An insider-dominated 
privatization may give workers in privatized companies more shares and therefore a higher stake 
in protecting privatization compared to workers under outsider-dominated privatization. Thus, 
the mode of privatization is expected to affect the difference in attitudes toward revising 
privatization between workers who remained in the state sector and those who did not. 
 We find that the effects of human capital, assets, and income on views about the revision 
of privatization do not depend on the governance institutions, inequality, or the method and scale 
of a country’s privatization. This is an important finding that suggests the broader relevance of 
our individual-level results because they turn out to be robust across a range of institutional and 
economic environments.18   
 In contrast, the effects of individual transition trajectories on attitudes toward the revision 
of privatization do depend on the institutional setting. In Table 4, we present estimates of 
interactions of country-level indicators of governance, privatization, and inequality with two 
variables: (1) a dummy variable indicating respondents who moved from work for wages to self-
                                                                                                                                                             
opposition to the revision of privatization. The only exception is that members of an ethnic minority are significantly 
more likely to oppose the revision of privatization on the grounds that privatization was fair.  
18 To save space, we do not report results for these interaction terms. 
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employment or entrepreneurship (an indication of a successful adjustment to transition) and (2) 
the number of years in which respondents experienced cuts in basic food consumption (an 
indication of severe hardship during transition).  
We find that higher scores on indices of democracy and voice and accountability tend to 
reinforce both the effect of moving from work for wages to self-employment and the effect of 
having to reduce basic food consumption.  In more democratic countries and countries with 
better voice and accountability, those who moved from work for wages to self-employment are 
even more likely to oppose the revision of privatization than their counterparts in a less 
democratic and less transparent environment. One standard deviation increases in the democracy 
and voice and accountability indices lead to 4.8 and 3.7 percentage point higher support for the 
status quo privatization outcome by those who moved from wage work to self employment or 
entrepreneurship. Thus, individuals who managed to adjust well to the new economic conditions 
express greater support for privatization where governance institutions are stronger.  
In contrast, governance institutions do not affect the difference in attitude towards the 
revision of privatization between individuals who had to cut down on food and the rest of the 
population. Yet, stronger democracy and accountability do reinforce the difference in 
preferences of these two groups concerning the superior property type. Those who experienced 
economic hardships express stronger support for state property (relative to the rest of the 
population) in countries with good governance institutions.  
We also explored how various aspects of privatization interact with individual transition 
histories (and other individual-level variables). The method of privatization does not affect the 
link between individual characteristics and attitudes towards privatization revision. But the scale 
of privatization and the time since the start of privatization do have significant effects: more 
extensive and earlier privatizations reinforce the differences in supporting the status quo between 
those who moved to self-employment and entrepreneurship and the rest of the population. This 
suggests that more extensive privatization increases opportunities for those moving from wage 
work to entrepreneurship. In addition, individuals, who experienced many years of food cuts 
express even more distrust for private property in countries with more extensive privatization 
programs. 
 Finally, we examine whether the level of economic inequality conditions the impact of 
transition experiences on evaluations of privatization. On the one hand, inequality may 
exacerbate differences in the attitudes toward revising privatization between winners and losers 
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from transition as only the narrow group of winners gains from privatization. On the other hand, 
inequality may reduce differences between groups with positive and negative transition 
experiences by generating political and social instability with negative consequences for all of 
them (except for the small group of very rich who are typically underrepresented in a household 
survey).  The same logic applies to the effect of inequality on people’s views about private 
versus state property.  
 We find that income inequality has a significant effect on the link between individual 
transition histories and preferences toward state versus private property but not on preferences 
over privatization revision. The difference between the effects of “positive” and “negative” 
transition histories on the preference over property type is significantly reduced in high-
inequality countries. In countries with a Gini coefficient which is one standard deviation below 
the mean, those who moved to self-employment have – compared to the rest of the population – 
a 10 percentage point greater opposition to re-nationalization that leaves assets in state hands. In 
contrast, in countries with a Gini coefficient one standard deviation above the mean, those who 
moved to self-employment have only a 1 percentage point greater opposition to re-
nationalization. Similarly, respondents who reduced basic food consumption have a 0.5 
percentage point higher support for re-nationalization in countries with a Gini coefficient one 
standard deviation below the mean; while this difference is only 0.2 percentage points in 
countries with a Gini coefficient one standard deviation above the mean. Thus, we find that 
economic inequality reduces differences in the attitudes of transition winners and losers towards 
state versus private property. 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
 Our results are robust to several refinements and alternative specifications, including 
different estimation techniques, different specifications, and different sets of covariates.19  
As alternatives to the multinomial logit estimation, we employ multinomial probit 
estimation. The results remain unaffected. We also experimented with other specifications (such 
as combining the four responses into two categories and running simple probit, logit, and OLS 
regressions) and the results did not change significantly. 
In the baseline specification, we adjust the standard errors to allow for clusters in error 
terms within PSUs to account for intra-PSU correlation. Alternatively, we have also added PSU 
                                                 
19 The results of all robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. 
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fixed effects (i.e., dummies for each PSU) dropping the location variables and the country 
dummies. The effects of interest remain robust to this specification with one notable exception: 
after controlling for PSU fixed effects, correlation between the perception of unfairness of 
privatization and transition-related hardships disappears. This, however, is explained by the fact 
that many transition-related hardships are PSU-specific rather than individual-specific.   
 We apply a weighting scheme for the summary statistics to account for the fact that the 
LiTS data turned out to be biased towards elderly and female respondents due to non-responses 
even though the sample was originally constructed to be representative. In the baseline 
regressions we do not apply this weighting scheme, but instead, introduce controls for age and 
gender. When we use the weights in the regression analysis, the results do not change. 
In the baseline specification, we include respondents’ attitudes toward a market economy, 
democracy, the preferred extent of state ownership of large companies, as well as perceptions of 
government as regressors. Yet, these variables may be endogenous to respondents’ views about 
revising privatization. If we exclude variables related to ideology and other perception variables 
from the list of regressors, the results for education, wealth, and ownership of property become 
more pronounced (as one would expect because of omitted ideology in these regressions), while 
the results for transition-related variables are unaffected.  
 We repeated our empirical exercise for each country individually to examine country-
specific patterns. As for the human capital and assets variables, the significance of the results 
varies somewhat across countries, but, qualitatively, the results are broadly consistent across 
countries. In contrast, we do find some differences across countries for the effects of career 
trajectories and transition hardships. These differences, however, are consistent with our analysis 
of Section 5.  
In addition, the results are robust to dropping the two most authoritarian countries – 
Uzbekistan and Belarus – from the sample and to using the most recent values instead of the 
over-time averages for the institutional indicators.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 Despite the strong support for privatization among economists and international financial 
organizations, public support for privatization is surprisingly low.  Using a survey of 28,000 
respondents, we report an extremely high level of support for revising privatization in 28 post-
communist countries.  More than 50 percent of the population in each of the 28 countries and 80 
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percent of all respondents support some form of revision of privatization from levying additional 
taxes on current owners of privatized assets to the full expropriation and re-nationalization of 
assets. Less than a third of respondents, however, favor a re-nationalization that leaves firms in 
the hands of the state.  
We identify factors that influence respondents’ preferences over revising privatization 
and explore their underlying motives for holding these views. Human capital poorly suited for a 
market economy with private ownership, lack of privately owned assets, economic hardships 
experienced during transition, and exposure to work in the state sector significantly increase 
support for revising privatization. The lack of human capital and private assets influence support 
for revising privatization primarily via a preference for state property over private property; 
whereas transition-related hardships and work in the state sector mainly influence support for 
revising privatization due to the perceived unfairness of privatization.  
The relationship between attitudes towards privatization and human capital and wealth is 
unaffected by a country’s institutional environment, the level of privatization, or the extent of 
inequality, which suggests the general relevance of these results. In contrast, the relationship 
between attitudes towards privatization and transition experiences is affected by these country 
characteristics. In countries with better governance, stronger democracy, and more pervasive 
private ownership, respondents moving from work for wages to self-employment (and 
entrepreneurship) are more likely to oppose revising privatization than their counterparts in 
countries with weaker institutions. Better governance institutions and low inequality reinforce 
the preference for state over private property for individuals who experienced significant 
economic losses during transition. Low inequality also reinforces differences between the effects 
of “positive” transition experiences on the preference over property type.  
 Our results suggest broader implications. First, respondents express fairly diverse views 
over how privatization should be revised. Indeed, almost one half of those who favor revising 
privatization want assets to ultimately end up in private hands. Therefore, one should not equate 
support for revising privatization with a preference for state property. Second, people differ in 
their motivation for revising privatization. Discriminating between these motivations is 
important as they suggest very different policies to increase the legitimacy of privatization. Some 
oppose privatization because they prefer state ownership, which in turn could be rooted in 
ideology or personal interest. Others favor private property in principle, but oppose privatization 
because it resulted in an unfair distribution of wealth. If public support for the revision of 
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privatization is rooted in relative losses from declining returns to human capital (as is the case for 
less skilled and long-time state sector workers), then retraining programs designed to match 
skills with demand from the new market sectors may prove to be an effective tool. If, however, 
public support for the revision of privatization is driven by concerns of fairness, governments 
may have to turn to redistributive policies which necessarily generate distortions in the 
investment decisions of current owners.  An optimistic lesson from our results is that most of the 
support for the revision of privatization due to unfairness comes from negative personal 
experiences during the transition, and these transition experiences are likely to play a smaller 
role in shaping attitudes over time.  
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Figure 1. Vertical axis: Percent of countries’ populations who agree that most privatized 
companies should be renationalized and kept in state hands (Source: “Life in Transition” Survey 
by the EBRD and the World Bank, EBRD 2007b). Horizontal axis: Average annual growth rate 
of real GDP between 1999 and 2006 (Source: EBRD, selected economic indicators as of May 
2007). 
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Table 1. 
“In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized companies? They should be…” 
 
Renationalized 
and kept in 
state hands 
Renationalized and 
then re-privatized 
again using a more 
transparent process 
Left in the hands of 
current owners 
provided that they pay 
privatized assets’ 
worth 
Left in the hands of 
current owners with 
no change 
Albania 14.5 18.7 51.7 15.2 
Armenia 40.5 22.6 26.8 10.1 
Azerbaijan 41.4 26.4 8.6 23.7 
Belarus 20.4 7.1 25.8 46.7 
Bosnia 25.0 17.9 43.4 13.7 
Bulgaria 28.8 15.8 48.3 7.2 
Croatia 23.9 29.1 41.0 6.0 
Czech Republic 13.0 11.8 50.6 24.6 
Estonia 22.4 10.7 22.6 44.4 
FYR Macedonia 35.3 20.7 38.0 6.0 
Georgia 30.9 31.9 14.0 23.2 
Hungary 24.6 10.2 51.9 13.3 
Kazakhstan 47.5 13.4 26.7 12.5 
Kyrgyzstan 43.8 11.2 17.7 27.4 
Latvia 19.1 14.2 40.4 26.4 
Lithuania 17.6 17.3 38.3 26.8 
Moldova 34.8 14.6 32.7 17.9 
Mongolia 19.9 22.6 21.0 36.5 
Montenegro 19.3 20.6 51.3 8.8 
Poland 22.4 20.4 37.2 20.0 
Romania 19.9 14.4 53.0 12.8 
Russia 36.7 13.3 31.5 18.5 
Serbia 20.0 18.3 50.7 11.0 
Slovakia 34.2 8.7 39.9 17.1 
Slovenia 12.4 19.6 36.6 31.4 
Tajikistan 48.4 13.7 21.9 16.0 
Ukraine 43.0 12.5 31.9 12.6 
Uzbekistan 51.6 10.6 22.6 15.3 
Total, % 29.0 16.7 34.8 19.4 
Cumulative, % 29.0 45.7 80.6 100.0 
Observations 8 077 4 654 9 697 5 412 
Notes:  
We are applying a weighting scheme for these summary statistics to ensure that the population as a 
whole is represented, taking into account the age and gender distribution of the population in each 
country (see EBRD 2007a: 6). The reported percentages have Bernoulli distribution. Their 
standard errors depend on the actual percentage and the number of observations (1000 per 
country); thus, they are equal to , where pi denotes the percentage points as 
reported in the table. The magnitudes of the SE indicate that if a difference between any two 
countries exceeds 3 percentage points, it is statistically significant. The result holds for each of the 
four alternatives.  
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Table 2. Interpretation of outcomes and types of hypothesis tests for marginal effects 
 Outcomes:  
  
Re-
nationalized 
and kept in 
state hands 
Re-
nationalized 
and then re-
privatized 
using a more 
transparent 
process 
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners 
provided 
that they pay 
privatized 
assets’ worth
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners with 
no change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test: 
  
Preference for or 
against 
privatization 
revision:   
For vs. Against 
For For For Against B1+B2+B3>B4 
Reason:  
State vs. Private State Private Private Private B1>B2+B3+B4 
Reason:  
Unfair vs. Fair Both equally Unfair Unfair Fair B2+B3>B4 
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Table 3. Multinomial logit. Marginal effects reported. 
Panel A. Direct effects
“In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized 
companies? They should be…”
Re-
nationalized 
and kept in 
state hands
Re-
nationalized 
and then re-
privatized 
again using a 
more 
transparent 
process
Left in the 
hands of 
current owners 
provided that 
they pay 
privatized 
assets’ worth
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners with 
no change
Revision 
(B1+B2+
B3=B4)
Property 
type 
(B1=B2+
B3+B4)
Fairness 
(B2+B3=
B4)
B1 B2 B3 B4  p-value  p-value  p-value
0.0015 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0007 0.00 0.00 0.90 For *** State ***
[4.82]*** [0.58] [2.87]*** [3.12]***
0.0481 -0.0134 -0.0154 -0.0193 0.08 0.00 0.66 For * State ***
[3.21]*** [1.22] [1.06] [1.75]*
0.0061 -0.0171 -0.0109 0.0218 0.03 0.62 0.01 Against ** Fair **
[0.50] [1.55] [0.80] [2.22]**
0.0079 0.0014 0.0042 -0.0136 0.09 0.46 0.25 For *
[0.75] [0.16] [0.36] [1.70]*
-0.0287 0.0123 0.0201 -0.0037 0.69 0.02 0.05 Private ** Unfair *
[2.35]** [1.26] [1.54] [0.40]
0.0126 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0149 0.00 0.01 0.03 For *** State *** Unfair **
[2.60]*** [0.41] [0.11] [3.69]***
-0.0350 0.0002 0.0140 0.0208 0.03 0.01 0.72 Against ** Private ***
[2.72]*** [0.02] [1.05] [2.21]**
-0.0057 0.0039 0.0040 -0.0021 0.10 0.00 0.00 Private *** Unfair ***
[3.24]*** [2.76]*** [2.09]** [1.64]
-0.0071 -0.0025 0.0044 0.0052 0.00 0.00 0.29 Against *** Private ***
[3.67]*** [1.56] [2.15]** [3.45]***
0.0046 0.0078 -0.0106 -0.0018 0.65 0.38 0.91
[0.87] [1.87]* [1.93]* [0.45]
0.0007 -0.0003 0.0020 -0.0023 0.00 0.38 0.00 For *** Unfair ***
[0.87] [0.49] [2.58]*** [3.75]***
-0.0033 0.0005 0.0026 0.0001 0.85 0.00 0.04 Private *** Unfair **
[3.26]*** [0.69] [2.65]*** [0.19]
-0.0618 -0.0137 0.0512 0.0243 0.18 0.00 0.71 Private ***
[3.13]*** [0.82] [2.36]** [1.35]
Continued to the next page…
Moved from work for wages to self-employment, 1989-2006
Transition-related employment history:
Number of jobs, 1989-2006
Years worked for wages in state sector, 1989-2006
Years worked for wages in private sector, 1989-2006
Assets:
Ownership of a house or apartment
Wealth (Decile of per capita household consumption)
Self-accessed difference wealth ranking b/w 1989 and 2006
               ="Below secondary"
               ="Professional, vocational training"
               ="Higher"
Self-reported poor health status [1-excellent, …, 5-poor]
Human capital:
Age 
Low-skills occupation
Education="Secondary" - comparison group
Outcomes:
Preference for 
or against 
revision of 
privatization:
Reason: 
Superior 
property type
Reason: 
Fairness of 
privatization
Chi-squared tests: "No view on.." Conclusion:
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“In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized 
companies? They should be…”
Re-
nationalized 
and kept in 
state hands
Re-
nationalized 
and then re-
privatized 
again using a 
more 
transparent 
process
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners 
provided that 
they pay 
privatized 
assets’ worth
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners 
with no 
change
Revision 
(B1+B2+
B3=B4)
Property 
type 
(B1=B2+
B3+B4)
Fairness 
(B2+B3=
B4)
0.0022 0.0045 -0.0005 -0.0062 0.00 0.32 0.01 For *** Unfair **
[0.99] [2.54]** [0.19] [3.04]***
0.0029 0.0034 0.0008 -0.0071 0.03 0.34 0.09 For ** Unfair *
[0.95] [1.24] [0.21] [2.20]**
0.0034 0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0024 0.01 0.00 0.49 For ** State ***
[2.97]*** [0.89] [1.35] [2.49]**
0.0123 0.0128 -0.0254 0.0003 0.97 0.17 0.39
[1.37] [1.79]* [2.68]*** [0.04]
0.1294 -0.0009 -0.0650 -0.0636 0.00 0.00 0.88 For *** State ***
[13.40]*** [0.11] [6.56]*** [8.47]***
Democracy="Agree with 'Democracy is preferable'" - comparison group
0.0741 -0.0211 -0.0143 -0.0386 0.00 0.00 0.88 For *** State ***
[5.83]*** [2.05]** [1.04] [3.78]***
0.0589 0.0029 -0.0600 -0.0018 0.84 0.00 0.00 State *** Fair ***
[5.09]*** [0.29] [4.54]*** [0.20]
Market="Agree with 'Market is preferable'" - comparison group
0.1353 -0.0087 -0.0068 -0.1197 0.00 0.00 0.00 For *** State *** Unfair ***
[11.99]*** [0.92] [0.58] [12.73]***
0.1013 0.0188 -0.0579 -0.0622 0.00 0.00 0.19 For *** State ***
[8.44]*** [2.04]** [4.77]*** [6.99]***
-0.0079 -0.0034 0.0071 0.0042 0.13 0.03 0.93 Private **
[2.23]** [1.12] [1.86]* [1.50]
-0.0116 -0.0059 0.0037 0.0138 0.00 0.01 0.01 Against *** Private *** Fair **
[2.60]*** [1.70]* [0.82] [4.32]***
0.0044 0.0102 -0.0035 -0.0111 0.02 0.50 0.08 For ** Unfair *
[0.67] [1.73]* [0.48] [2.29]**
Continued to the next page…
Perceptions of government:
Agree with "Government can be trusted"
Agree with "There is less corruption in 2006 than in 1989"
Agree with "Law and order are very important"
               ="Agree with 'Autocracy is preferable'"
               ="Agree with 'Indifferent b/w autocracy and democracy'"
               ="Agree with ''Central planning is preferable'"
               ="Agree with 'Indifferent b/w central planning and market'"
Years had to cut down on basic food consumption, 1989-2006
Ideology:
Communist party members in the family ever
Agree with "State should own large companies"
Transition-related hardships:
Years had to accept wage cuts or wage arrears, 1989-2006
Years had to sell household assets, 1989-2006
Outcomes: Chi-squared tests: "No view on.." Conclusion:
Preference for 
or against 
revision of 
privatization:
Reason: 
Superior 
property type
Reason: 
Fairness of 
privatization
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“In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized 
companies? They should be…”
Re-
nationalized 
and kept in 
state hands
Re-
nationalized 
and then re-
privatized 
again using a 
more 
transparent 
process
Left in the 
hands of 
current owners 
provided that 
they pay 
privatized 
assets’ worth
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners with 
no change
Revision 
(B1+B2+
B3=B4)
Property 
type 
(B1=B2+
B3+B4)
Fairness 
(B2+B3=
B4)
-0.0159 0.0209 -0.0145 0.0095 0.10 0.03 0.79 Private **
[2.13]** [3.49]*** [1.83]* [1.64]
0.0039 0.0017 -0.0032 -0.0025 0.25 0.14 0.81
[1.46] [0.80] [1.10] [1.16]
0.0429 -0.0104 -0.0134 -0.0191 0.12 0.01 0.85 State ***
[2.68]*** [0.79] [0.78] [1.57]
0.0052 0.0123 -0.0001 -0.0174 0.15 0.75 0.22
[0.31] [0.97] [0.00] [1.46]
0.0013 0.0165 -0.0482 0.0305 0.26 0.97 0.31
[0.03] [0.46] [0.97] [1.12]
-0.0259 0.0320 -0.0205 0.0144 0.21 0.12 0.90
[1.55] [2.49]** [1.32] [1.25]
0.0272 0.0611 -0.0764 -0.0119 0.54 0.20 0.92
[1.28] [3.01]*** [3.22]*** [0.61]
0.0028 -0.0122 -0.0056 0.0151 0.46 0.92 0.45
[0.09] [0.48] [0.17] [0.74]
0.0210 -0.0139 -0.0358 0.0287 0.03 0.21 0.00 Against ** Fair ***
[1.25] [1.10] [2.15]** [2.20]**
0.0068 0.0275 -0.0230 -0.0113 0.30 0.61 0.49
[0.51] [2.33]** [1.51] [1.03]
Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood
Chi-squared
Panel B. Interactions
-0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0022 0.00 0.74 0.01 Against *** Fair ***
[0.33] [2.25]** [0.05] [3.07]***
-0.0022 -0.0016 0.0015 0.0022 0.04 0.11 0.30 Against **
[1.61] [1.38] [1.02] [2.10]**
All baseline covariates and country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observations 19733 19733 19733 19733
Pseudo R-squared
Basic controls:
Gender [Male compared to Female]
Household size
Location="Metropolitan area" - comparison group
               ="Rural"
               ="Urban, excluding metropolitan area"
Religion="Christian"  - comparison group
               ="Buddhist"
               ="Atheistic / agnostic / none"
               ="Muslim"
               ="Other"
Member of an ethnic minority
Unemployed, 2006
19738
0.1
-23597
2728.84
Interaction: Wealth X Education [1-Below secondary; 4-Higher]
Interaction: Age X High-skills occupation
0.11
Outcomes: Chi-squared tests: "No view on.." Conclusion:
Preference for 
or against 
revision of 
privatization:
Reason: 
Superior 
property type
Reason: 
Fairness of 
privatization
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Table 4. Interactions with country-level variables. Marginal effects reported. 
“In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized companies? They should 
be…”
Re-
nationalized 
and kept in 
state hands
Re-
nationalized 
and then re-
privatized 
again using a 
more 
transparent 
process
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners 
provided that 
they pay 
privatized 
assets’ worth
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners with 
no change
Revision 
(B1+B2+
B3=B4)
Property 
type 
(B1=B2+
B3+B4)
Fairness 
(B2+B3=
B4)
B1 B2 B3 B4  p-value  p-value  p-value
Governance and democracy:
Interactions with "Moved from wage work to self-employment":
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Democracy index -0.0130 -0.0091 0.0070 0.0151 0.02 0.38 0.37 Against **
[1.91]* [1.65]* [0.92] [2.30]**
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Government Effectivness -0.0461 -0.0429 0.0469 0.0420 0.20 0.52 0.91
[1.11] [1.42] [1.21] [1.29]
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Regulatory quality -0.0416 -0.0311 0.0434 0.0293 0.21 0.60 0.82
[1.42] [1.35] [1.48] [1.26]
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Voice & accountability -0.0513 -0.0297 0.0368 0.0442 0.05 0.46 0.50 Against **
[1.84]* [1.35] [1.28] [1.96]*
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Political stability -0.0454 -0.0415 0.0419 0.0449 0.07 0.85 0.77 Against *
[1.51] [1.94]* [1.36] [1.82]*
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Rule of law -0.0380 -0.0617 0.0477 0.0520 0.08 0.85 0.54 Against *
[0.97] [2.11]** [1.28] [1.73]*
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Corruption perception -0.0154 -0.0318 0.0255 0.0217 0.19 0.56 0.44
[0.58] [1.54] [1.06] [1.31]
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Control of corruption -0.0402 -0.0518 0.0419 0.0501 0.13 0.11 0.17
[0.88] [1.56] [0.99] [1.52]
Interactions with "Yrs cut down on basic food consumption":
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Democracy index 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0000 0.95 0.01 0.91 State **
[2.48]** [0.51] [2.41]** [0.06]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Government Effectivness 0.0030 0.0001 -0.0033 0.0001 0.94 0.61 0.35
[1.51] [0.09] [1.43] [0.08]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Regulatory quality 0.0028 0.0000 -0.0029 0.0002 0.90 0.49 0.45
[1.85]* [0.01] [1.71]* [0.13]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Voice & accountability 0.0033 0.0004 -0.0037 0.0001 0.97 0.05 0.50 State *
[2.25]** [0.30] [2.13]** [0.04]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Political stability 0.0025 -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.62 0.72 0.96
[1.65]* [1.14] [0.28] [0.50]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Rule of law 0.0038 -0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0006 0.70 0.79 0.63
[1.94]* [0.64] [0.97] [0.39]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Corruption perception 0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0019 0.0004 0.67 0.13 0.36
[1.74]* [0.58] [1.32] [0.42]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Control of corruption 0.0042 -0.0006 -0.0036 0.0001 0.96 0.06 0.63 State *
[1.92]* [0.35] [1.41] [0.05]
Continued to the next page…
Outcomes: Chi-squared tests: "No view on.." Conclusion:
Preference for or 
against revision 
of privatization:
Reason: Superior 
property type
Reason: 
Fairness of 
privatization
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“In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized companies? They should 
be…”
Re-
nationalized 
and kept in 
state hands
Re-
nationalized 
and then re-
privatized 
again using a 
more 
transparent 
process
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners 
provided that 
they pay 
privatized 
assets’ worth
Left in the 
hands of 
current 
owners with 
no change
Revision 
(B1+B2+
B3=B4)
Property 
type 
(B1=B2+
B3+B4)
Fairness 
(B2+B3=
B4)
Privatization:
Interactions with "Moved from wage work to self-employment":
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Privatization scale in 2006 -0.0018 -0.0379 0.0358 0.0039 0.00 0.53 0.00 Against *** Fair ***
[0.09] [2.20]** [1.52] [0.25]
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Yrs since start of privatization -0.0177 -0.0183 0.0157 0.0203 0.08 0.32 0.38 Against *
[1.19] [1.71]* [1.19] [1.77]*
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Insider privatization 0.0838 0.0054 -0.0739 -0.0153 0.70 0.52 0.75
[1.95]* [0.15] [1.63] [0.38]
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Outsider privatization -0.0574 -0.0461 0.0922 0.0112 0.79 0.77 0.73
[1.31] [1.16] [2.01]** [0.27]
Interactions with "Yrs cut down on basic food consumption":
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Privatization scale in 2006 0.0009 0.0012 -0.0031 0.0011 0.23 0.08 0.14 State *
[0.72] [1.20] [2.28]** [1.21]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Yrs since start of privatization 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.73 0.89 0.54
[1.76]* [0.24] [1.14] [0.34]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Insider privatization -0.0024 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0029 0.13 0.36 0.43
[0.99] [0.13] [0.29] [1.53]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Outsider privatization 0.0011 0.0014 0.0001 -0.0026 0.20 0.21 0.20
[0.45] [0.78] [0.04] [1.28]
Gini:
Moved from wage work to self-employment X Gini coefficient 1.1663 -0.4905 -0.1373 -0.5385 0.18 0.10 0.62 State *
[2.47]** [1.36] [0.23] [1.33]
Yrs cut down on basic food consumption X Gini coefficient -0.0305 0.0354 -0.0255 0.0206 0.23 0.05 0.24 Private *
[1.18] [1.99]** [0.71] [1.20]
Outcomes: Chi-squared tests: "No view on.." Conclusion:
Preference for or 
against revision 
of privatization:
Reason: Superior 
property type
Reason: 
Fairness of 
privatization
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Appendix 
 
The Life in Transition Survey: Technical Details 
 
The “Life in Transition Survey” (LiTS) was jointly conducted by the EBRD and the World Bank 
in 2006 (see EBRD 2007a,b). LiTS consists of 28,000 interviews in 28 post-communist 
transition countries in Europe and Central Asia, with the exception of Turkmenistan. In each 
country a sample of 1,000 individuals was selected randomly for face-to-face interviews.  
 
Coverage 
LiTS covers four broad themes. First, it collects personal information on aspects of material 
well-being, including household income, possession of consumer goods, access to local public 
services and utilities. Secondly, the survey generates measures of satisfaction and attitudes 
towards economic and political reforms as well as public expectations and appetite for further 
reforms. Thirdly, it captures individual “histories” through transition, as the individual’s family 
background; employment situations before the start of economic reforms, throughout the 
transition period and now; events that punctuated their lives during transition; and strategies to 
cope with such a transformation. Finally, the questionnaire attempts to capture the extent to 
which crime and corruption are affecting people’s live, and the degree to which trust, both 
among ordinary citizens and in state institutions, has changed over time. 
 
Sample selection 
The sample selection consisted of two stages. First, 50 primary sampling units (PSUs) were 
randomly selected, based on information from the most recent census in the country. Secondly, 
20 households were selected at random from each PSU. Within each household, the head of the 
household (or another knowledgeable household member) responded to the questions on aspects 
of material well-being, while for the other questions one household member (aged 18 or over) 
was randomly selected to respond. 
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Table A1: Description of the variables 
 
Variable Description 
(1) Individual-level variables Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD and World Bank, 2006. 
Dependent variable:  
Revision of privatization 
Four-category response indicating whether the respondent21 prefers to (1) 
renationalize most privatized companies and keep them in state hands; (2) 
renationalize most privatized companies and then re-privatize them, using a more 
transparent process; (3) leave most privatized companies in the hands of current 
owners provided that they pay what the assets are worth; and (4) leave most 
privatized companies in the hands of current owners without any change. This 
variable is treated as a multinomial one. 
(1.1) Human capital 
Age Age of the respondent. 
High-skills occupation Dummy indicating that in 2006 the respondent worked for wages in an occupation 
that requires high skills (i.e., legislators, senior government officials, enterprise 
managers, director/chief executives, owners of business, physicists, engineers, 
mathematicians, architects, computing professionals, medical doctors, dentists, 
pharmacists, teachers (university, secondary, primary), lawyers, accountants, 
authors, professionals and similar occupations). 
Low-skills occupation Dummy indicating that in 2006 the respondent worked for wages in an occupation 
that requires only low skills. 
Educational degrees Highest educational degree obtained by the respondent: (1) no degree / no 
education, (2) compulsory school education, (3) secondary education, (4) 
professional, vocational school/training, (5) higher professional degree (university, 
college), (6) post graduate degree. 
Self-reported poor health 
status 
Subjective assessment of the respondent’s health conditions: (1) very good, (2) 
good, (3) medium, (4) bad, (5) very bad. 
(1.2) Assets 
Ownership of a house or 
apartment 
Dummy indicating that any household member (including the respondent) is the 
majority owner of a house (detached, semi-detached, townhouse, terrace house), 
apartment, or flat. This information is given by the head of household (or another 
knowledgeable household member). 
Wealth Approximated by the within-country deciles of total household’s annualized 
consumption expenditures per (equalized) household member. Children younger 
than 14 years enter with a weight of 0.3. The information for consumption 
expenditures is given by the head of household (or another knowledgeable 
household member). Our measure of wealth ranges from 1 to 10 based on the 
expenditure decile in which a respondent is located. 
Self-accessed difference 
wealth ranking b/w 1989 and 
2006 
Subjective household’s wealth ranking on an imaginary ten-step ladder (from the 
poorest to the richest), difference today with respect to 1989 (retrospective). This 
information is given by the head of household (or another knowledgeable 
household member). 
 Continued to the next page… 
 
                                                 
21 Unless stated otherwise, we are referring to the respondent who was randomly selected to answer the questions 
concerning attitudes and values, current activities, education and labor, and life history (i.e. themes 2 to 4 as stated 
above when describing the coverage of LiTS). 
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Table A1: Continued 
Variable Description 
(1.3) Transition-related employment history  
Number of jobs, 1989-2006 Number of jobs for respondents worked for wages (for an employer) in any of the 
years from 1989 to 2006. A different job is defined by a different occupational 
position working for the same employer, by a change in the ownership type of the 
enterprise, and by a change of employer. 
Years worked for wages in the 
state sector, 1989-2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) when the respondent worked for wages in the state 
sector (i.e. the state was the owner of the company). 
Years worked for wages in the 
private sector, 1989-2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) when the respondent worked for wages in the 
private sector (i.e. the owner of the company was a private one). 
Moved from work for wages 
to self-employment, 1989-
2006 
Dummy indicating that the respondent started with working for wages for an 
employer (typically a state sector employer) and ended up with working as a self-
employed (eventually going through an intermediate state of no employment). We 
are only referring to within-working-age respondents, i.e. respondents with an age 
between 18 and 60 years for any year. 
(1.4) Transition-related hardships 
Years had to accept wage cuts 
or wage arrears, 1989-2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) when the respondent had to accept wage cuts or 
wage arrears. 
Years had to sell household 
assets, 1989-2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) when the respondent had to sell some of the 
household assets. 
Years had to cut down on 
basic food consumption, 
1989-2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) when the respondent had to cut down on basic food 
consumption. 
(1.5) Ideology 
Communist party members in 
the family ever 
Dummy indicating that anybody of the family ever was a member of the 
Communist Party (including the respondent). This variable is completely missing 
for Belarus; we assumed membership for all the respondents of this country. 
Agree with “State should own 
large companies” 
Dummy getting a value of 1 if the respondent thinks that the state should be 
strongly involved in the ownership of large companies in this country, and getting 
a value of 0 if the respondent thinks that the state should not be involved at all or 
only moderately involved. 
Democracy Agreement with the statement that (1) democracy is preferable to any other form of 
political system, (2) under some circumstances an authoritarian government may 
be preferable to a democratic one, and (3) indifference b/w autocracy and 
democracy. 
Market Agreement with the statement that (1) a market economy is preferable to any other 
form of economic system, (2) under some circumstances a planned economy may 
be preferable to a market economy, and (3) indifference b/w planned and market 
economy. 
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Table A1: Continued 
Variable Description 
(1.6) Perceptions of government 
Agree with “Government can 
be trusted” 
Extent to which the respondent has trust in the government or the cabinet of 
ministers: (1) complete distrust, (2) some distrust, (3) neither trust nor distrust (4) 
some trust, (5) complete trust. 
Agree with “There is less 
corruption in 2006 than 
around 1989” 
Agreement with the statement that there is less corruption in 2006 than around 
1989: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither disagree nor agree, (4) agree, 
(5) strongly agree. 
Agree with “Law & order are 
very important” 
Agreement with the statement that law and order is important for the country: (1) 
strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither disagree nor agree, (4) agree, (5) 
strongly agree. 
(1.7) Basic controls 
Gender Gender of the respondent (0=female, 1=male). 
Household size Number of household members. 
Location Location of the interviewed household in a (1) metropolitan, (2) rural, or (3) urban 
(excluding metropolitan) area. 
Religion Religion of the respondent: (1) Christian, (2) Buddhist, (3) atheistic / agnostic / 
none, (4) Muslim, (5) other. 
Member of an ethnic minority Dummy indicating that the respondent belongs to an ethnic minority in this 
country. 
Unemployment, 2006 Dummy getting a value of 1 if the respondent is actively looking for a job at the 
moment. 
(2) National-level variables 
(2.1) Institutional quality indicators 
Corruption 
perception index 
Corruption perception index, avg. 1999-2006. Scale from 0 to 10, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes. Source: Transparency International 
Democracy index  Average index of democracy for 1991-2004. Scale from 0 to 10 with higher values 
corresponding to more democratic outcomes. Source: Polity IV Dataset. 
Voice & 
accountability 
Voice & accountability represents the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and free media. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. 
for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Political stability Political stability represents perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence 
and terrorism. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Government 
effectiveness 
Government effectiveness represents the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
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Table A1: Continued 
Variable Description 
(2.1) Institutional quality indicators, continued 
Rule of law Rule of law represents the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher values correspond to better governance 
outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2006). 
Control of 
corruption 
Control of corruption represents the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. 
for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Regulatory quality Regulatory quality represents the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Higher 
values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2005. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
(2.2) Privatization and inequality 
Privatization scale 
in 2006 
Degree of current privatization progress: large-scale plus small-scale privatization in 2006. 
Large-scale privatization is ranked from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ (more than 75 per 
cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance). Small-
scale privatization is ranked from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ (no state ownership of 
small enterprises; effective tradability of land). Source: EBRD (2006), transition indicators22. 
Years since start of 
privatization 
Number of years since the primary type of privatization was initiated. Source: Bennett, 
Estrin, and Urga (2007). 
Insider privatization Insider type of primary privatization: management-employee buy-outs (MEBO) plus 
vouchers with insider preferences. Importance of each different method from the beginning 
of transition until 1999 (or, resp., 1997). Sources: EBRD (1997, p. 90) and EBRD (1999, p. 
32). 
Outsider 
privatization 
Outsider type of primary privatization: direct sales plus vouchers with equal access. 
Importance of each different method from the beginning of transition until 1999 (or, resp., 
1997). Sources: EBRD (1997, p. 90) and EBRD (1999, p. 32). 
Gini  Gini coefficient, most recent values. Sources: World Bank (2005), CIA World Factbook 
2006, Human Development Report 2006. 
 
                                                 
22 The transition indicator scores reflect the judgment of the EBRD’s Office of the Chief Economist about country-
specific progress in transition. The scores are based on a classification system, which was originally developed in 
the 1994 Transition Report, but has been refined and amended in subsequent reports. The highest value of these 
scores corresponds to standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies. The data and 
methodology concepts can be downloaded at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm.  
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Table A2: Summary statistics for individual-level variables 
Variable # of obs Mean SD Min Max 
Renationalize most privatized companies and keep them in state hands 27 840 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Renationalize most privatized companies and then  
re-privatize them again using a more transparent process 
27 840 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Leave most privatized companies in the hands of current owners  
provided they pay privatized assets’ worth 
27 840 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Leave most privatized companies in the hands of current owners w/o change 27 840 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Age 28 000 45.97 16.87 17 97 
The occupation in 2006 requires high skills 27 590 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Attained educational degree 27 993 3.50 1.13 1 6 
No degree / no education 27 993 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Compulsory school education 27 993 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Secondary education 27 993 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Professional, vocational school/training 27 993 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Higher professional degree (university, college) 27 993 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Post graduate degree 27 993 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Self-reported poor health status 27 996 2.71 0.99 1 5 
Ownership of a house or apartment 28 000 0.85 0.35 0 1 
Wealth (deciles of per capita household consumption) 28 000 5.68 2.93 1 10 
Self-accessed difference wealth ranking b/w 1989 and 2006 25 179 -1.37 2.47 -9 9 
Number of jobs, 1989-2006 27 611 1.09 0.99 0 5 
Years worked for wages in the state sector, 1989-2006 27 611 4.48 6.11 0 18 
Years worked for wages in the private sector, 1989-2006 27 611 2.54 4.92 0 18 
Moved from work for wages to self-employment, 1989-2006 27 640 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Years had to accept wage cuts or arrears, 1989-2006 27 450 0.57 1.87 0 18 
Years had to sell household assets, 1989-2006 27 450 0.27 1.19 0 18 
Years had to cut down on basic food consumption, 1989-2006 27 450 1.86 4.10 0 18 
Communist party members in the family ever 27 946 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Agree with “State should own large companies” 27 965 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Autocracy is preferable 27 965 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Indifference b/w autocracy and democracy 27 965 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Democracy is preferable 27 965 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Planned economy is preferable  27 964 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Indifference b/w planned and market economy 27 964 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Market economy is preferable  27 964 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Trust in the government/cabinet of ministers 26 569 2.67 1.36 1 5 
There is less corruption in 2006 than around 1989 23 022 2.18 1.12 1 5 
Importance of law & order 27 622 4.42 0.87 1 5 
Gender 28 000 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Household size 28 000 2.81 1.66 1 12 
Location==metropolitan 28 000 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Location==rural 28 000 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Location==urban (excluding metropolitan) 28 000 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Religion==Christian 28 000 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Religion==Buddhist 28 000 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Religion==atheistic/agnostic/none 28 000 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Religion==Muslim 28 000 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Religion==other 28 000 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Member of an ethnic minority 27 974 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Unemployment (actively looking for a job at the moment) 28 000 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Notes: We are applying a weighting scheme for these summary statistics to ensure that the population as a whole is 
represented, taking into account the age and gender distribution of the population in each country (see EBRD 2007a: 6). 
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Table A3: Summary statistics for national-level variables 
 
Variable 
# of 
obs Mean SD Min Max 
Corruption perception index 27 3.30 1.10 1.94 5.89 
Democracy index 26 5.82 3.22 0.00 10.00 
Voice & accountability 27 -0.06 0.84 -1.63 1.09 
Political stability 27 -0.14 0.78 -1.66 0.99 
Government effectiveness 27 -0.24 0.66 -1.24 0.84 
Rule of law 27 -0.34 0.66 -1.28 0.81 
Control of corruption 27 -0.37 0.61 -1.21 0.96 
Regulatory quality 27 -0.16 0.83 -1.77 1.31 
Privatization scale in 2006 28 7.12 1.10 3.33 8.33 
Years since start of privatization 23 12.35 2.08 8.00 16.00 
Insider privatization was the primary type of 
privatization in the 90s 
25 0.44 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Outsider privatization was the primary type 
of privatization in the 90s 
25 0.48 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Gini coefficient 27 0.30 0.04 0.18 0.39 
Notes:  
This table refers for most of the variables to over-time country averages. For the concrete time frame for each variable 
see Table A1. 
 
 
 
